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DIMINISHED CAPACITY
by Grant B. Cooper*
The name and reputation of M'Naughton's Case' are better known
than the case itself. A brief resume of the facts surrounding the crime,
the trial, and its aftermath will be useful in understanding the back-
ground of the M'Naughton Rule and the problem of criminal respon-
sibility in California.2
I. HISTORY OF THE M'NAUGHTON RULE
Daniel M'Naughton, a young Scot, had developed the paranoid delu-
sion that he was being persecuted by the Tory Party. He decided to end
this supposed persecution by assassinating the Tory Prime Minister,
Robert Peel, whom he had never seen. In January 1843, M'Naughton
shot and killed Peel's secretary, Edward Drummond, believing him to be
the Prime Minister. M'Naughton had observed Drummond riding in
Peel's carriage during a royal procession in Edinburgh, Scotland, a num-
ber of months before. Unknown to M'Naughton, Peel was riding in
Queen Victoria's carriage at the time and he mistakenly assumed
Drummond was Peel.
In the years preceding Drummond's death a series of attempted as-
sassinations had been made on Queen Victoria and various high govern-
ment officials. In addition, the political atmosphere was highly charged
with emotion. Consequently, the crime and the trial aroused great pub-
lic and official interest.
The trial developed into a battle between modem medical knowledge
and ancient legal authority. In anticipation of the defense, the prosecu-
tor's opening statement contained a detailed discussion of the traditional
English law of criminal insanity. He emphasized Sir Mathew Hale's au-
* Member of the California Bar.
1 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
2 With very slight modification, the history of the M'Naughton Rule is from
THE FIRST REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONS ON INSANITY AND CRIMINAL OF-
FENDERS [CALIF.] 73 (July 7, 1962) (hereinafter cited COMMISSION REP'T) addressed
to the Governor and Legislature of California. The Chairman of the Special Commis-
sion on Substantive Problems was Thomas C. Lynch, then District Attorney of San
Francisco County, who was succeeded in November, 1960 by Arthur H. Sherry, Pro-
fessor of Law and Criminology, University of California, Berkeley. The author was
Chairman of the Special Commission on Procedural Problems.
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thoritative Pleas of the Crown, published in 1736, with its opinion on
the moon's influence on insanity. Although the prosecution had caused
a mental examination to be made of M'Naughton, no medical experts
were produced at the trial by the prosecution. The defense counsel,
Alexander Cockburn, in his opening statement relied heavily on the
relatively modem opinions of the American psychiatrist, Isaac Ray, set
forth in his then recent publication, Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity.'
He also produced a number of medical experts, all of whom testified
that M'Naughton was insane. Upon completion of the defense's medi-
cal evidence, Lord Chief Justice Tindal, after determining that there
would be no contrary medical evidence, directed the jury to return a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. M'Naughton then was con-
fined in a mental institution where he remained until his death in 1865.
While the crime and the trial aroused great public interest, the acquit-
tal brought immediate protest and vigorous indignation. The contem-
porary newspapers bitterly criticized the decision. Even Queen Victoria,
in a letter to Sir Robert Peel, protested the outcome. Although
M'Naughton apparently had no political interests, the assassination was
generally regarded as a political plot. The public simply refused to
believe that M'Naughton was insane.
The furor spilled into Parliament where the House of Lords called
upon the judges to explain their conduct. The House of Lords pro-
pounded five questions to the judges of England regarding the criminal
responsibility of persons with insane delusions. The answers by four-
teen of the fifteen justices to these five questions comprise the famous
M'Naughton Rule. Although the answers were not a legal opinion and
were in response to questions involving the limited specific psychologi-
cal symptom of delusion, they were soon accepted by the courts in Eng-
land and in most of the United States as stating the general law of crimi-
nal responsibility.
The M'Naughton Rule was the culmination of a long struggle by
English courts and legal scholars over the rule of responsibility.
The present M'Naughton test of responsibility evolved at a time when
there was widespread belief in witchcraft and demonology on the part
of many educated and knowledgeable persons. Although civilization
has made considerable progress from M'Naughton's time, when "the
popular notions [of insanity] .. . were derived from the observationof
those wretched inmates of the mad-houses, whom chains and stripes,
3 I. RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (lst ed. 1838).
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cold and filth, had reduced to the stupidity of the idiot or exasperated to
the fury of a demon", 4 and despite constant criticism, little significant
change in the future development of a rule of responsibility occurred
before 1954.5
The classic test for criminal responsibility known to the English
speaking world and beyond, is the M'Naughton Rule:
[To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved, that at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.(
With some variations this is the rule applied in most American juris-
dictions. It is presently the rule in California. 7 Today, as in M'Naugh-
ton's time, legal insanity is a complete defense to any crime, felony or
misdemeanor, whether the offense be a specific intent crime or a non-
specific intent crime. This is so because a legally insane person is a
person incapable of committing crime.8
Between the two extremes of 'sanity' and [Legal] 'insanity' lies every
shade of disordered or deficient mental condition, grading imperceptibly
one into another. [T]here are persons, who, while not totally insane,
possess such low mental powers as to be incapable of deliberation and
premeditation [necessary to commit specific intent crimes].9
Should insanity less than legal insanity (and sometimes referred to as
partial insanity, medical insanity, but now in California referred to as
"diminished capacity"'") constitute any defense to crime? Or stated an-
other way, should one's responsibility for crime be diminished to the
extent that his mental capacity affects his ability to form the specific in-
tent ingredient necessary to complete the elements of the particular
crime charged?
The Supreme Court of California has wrestled with this problem since
the legislature amended section 1026 of the Penal Code and other re-
lated sections in 1927. Prior to 1927 a defendant charged with crime
4 Id. at 21.
5 See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
6 8 Eng. Rep. at 719.
7 People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 799-803, 394 P.2d 959, 961-63, 40 Cal. Rptr.
271, 273-75 (1964); CAL. JuRY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL No. 4.00 (West 3d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited CAL.c].
8 CAL. PEN. CODE § 26(3) (West 1957).
9 People v. Danielly, 33 Cal. 2d 362, 388, 202 P.2d 18, 33 (1949), quoting Fisher
v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 492 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
10 CALJic No. 3.35, 8.87.
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could interpose the defense of insanity (legal insanity) by simply plead-
ing not guilty. As a result, it often occurred that the prosecution was
unaware that the defense of insanity was being relied upon until the de-
fendant presented his evidence. Prior to 1927 there was but one trial;
it was not bifurcated as it is today. In consequence, notwithstanding the
fact that defendant's evidence did not always meet the requirements of
the defense of legal insanity under M'Naughton, it often disclosed that
the defendant was suffering from a mental illness or defect less than
legal insanity and the jury as a practical matter apparently took such
facts into consideration. On occasion they returned verdicts of lesser
degrees than those charged. Because the prosecution had no notice of
the insanity defense, they were sometimes unprepared to meet the de-
fendant's insanity defense with expert testimony, resulting on occasions
in verdicts of "not guilty".
The legislature of California appointed a Commission for the Reform
of Criminal Procedure to correct what they evidently believed to be de-
fects in the law. As a result of the Commission's study and recom-
mendations, the legislature amended section 1026 of the Penal Code
and the other related sections. To section 1016 of the Penal Code they
added the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity." This amendment
thus afforded the prosecution ample notice of the interposition of this
defense. Section 1027 of the Penal Code was amended to provide for
the appointment of psychiatrists by the court;' 2 thus it may be assumed
the legislature believed this procedure would remove the gamesman-
ship element of the trial and, at least theoretically, result in a search for
truth as to the defendant's sanity or insanity.
As so often happens when attempts are made to correct alleged
abuses, the legislature in following the Commission's recommendations,
allowed the' pendulum to swing too far. In amending section 1026 of
the Penal Code they provided for a bifurcated trial. Thus if a defendant
entered a plea of not guilty, coupled with a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity, this amendment provided that upon the trial on the merits
of the not guilty plea "he [was] first tried as if he had entered such
other not guilty plea . . . and in such trial he shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to have been sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been
committed."' 3
"1 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016 (Ch. 677, § 1 [1927] Cal. Stat. 1148).
12 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1027 (Ch. 385, § 1 [1927] Cal. Stat. 702).
13 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1957).
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The first attack on the constitutionality of these amendments oc-
cured in People v. Hickman.'4 In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Waste, the defendant's contentions that the new procedure was uncon-
stitutional was put down with the observation:
We are firmly convinced that no right of the defendant guaranteed
by the state constitution, was injuriously or at all affected by his being
compelled to go to trial under the sections of the code as recently
amended. 15
In Hickman, however, the defendant did not enter a plea of not guilty,
but relied solely upon his defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Six months later the court, in two cases, faced a major assault on the
new legislation. 16
In each case the defendants were convicted of first degree murder and
contended generally, first, that the present law was unconstitutional in
that the statutes as amended affected substantive rights of persons ac-
cused of crimes, rather than procedural rights and thus deprived defend-
ants of due process, an invasion of the common law right to a jury
trial under the plea of not guilty. Second, that by presuming a defend-
ant "conclusively sane" on the issue of guilt or innocence at the time
of the commission of the alleged offense, a defendant was prevented
from introducing evidence to establish his mental condition at the
time the offense was committed, for the purpose of showing a lack
of specific intent, malice or premeditation. 17 Brushing aside these con-
tentions the California Supreme Court ruled that because section 1026
provided that a defendant was conclusively presumed to be sane at the
time the offense was committed, evidence of his mental state was irrel-
evant, immaterial and hence inadmissible under his plea of not guilty.
Specifically, they held "in this state so far as accountability is con-
cerned there is no middle ground."'
In a lengthy, vigorous dissent, Justice Preston, presaging People v.
Wells,19 the law today, by more than twenty years, attacked the ma-
jority in People v. Troche2" in biting fashion, observing that there could
'4 204 Cal. 470, 268 P. 909 (1928).
15 Id. at 478, 268 P. at 912.
16 People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 P. 767 (1928); People v. Leong Fook, 206
Cal. 64, 273 P. 779 (1928).
'7 People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 41, 273 P. 767, 769-70 (1928).
18 Id. at 46, 273 P. at 772, quoting People v. Perry, 195 Cal. 623, 739, 234 P. 890,
896 (1925).
19 33 Cal. 2d 330, 351-51, 202 P.2d 53, 66 (1949).
20 206 Cal. 35, 52-57, 273 P. 767, 774-77 (1928).
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not be any criminal intent, malice, deliberation or premeditation with-
out sanity. He successfully argued the elementary principle of crim-
inal law, that under a plea of not guilty, the jury must find the exis-
tence or absence of all the elements of the crimed charged. In elo-
quent language he concluded:
This court should be quick and decisive in its action to declare anew
our Bill of Rights and to preserve the essential attributes of a jury trial
as known to the common law and as preserved by our constitution.
These provisions are so obnoxious to the spirit of our institutions that the
blood of Abel 'crieth from the ground' for vindication. 21
Justice Preston renewed his attack on the new legislation with equal
force in another dissenting opinion in People v. Leong Fook22 decided
the same day.
In an automatic appeal in 1942 from a judgment of conviction of
first degree murder imposing the death penalty, one John Coleman
complained on appeal that the jury should have had before it on the
trial of the issue of not guilty the testimony on the insanity issue; that
otherwise it could not justly determine the degree of the crime.23 The
court in upholding his conviction, again rejected the same assaults on
the amendments to the Penal Code with the terse statement:
They were declared valid in 1928 in the case of People v. Troche
and have been upheld in a line of decisions for the last thirteen years
and more .... In the intervening years the Legislature has not seen fit
to change those laws in any substantial respect, and not at all in the re-
spects of which the defendant in this case now complains. 24
The legislature did not move to rectify the injustice. It was not un-
til the year 1949 that the supreme court finally interpreted the law as
it is today.
II. THE WELLS-GORSHEN RULE
Little did Wesley Robert Wells realize while serving a life sentence,
that he would fill a niche in the legal annals of California. Found guilty
by the jury of assaulting a prison guard, and having been found sane
under his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, he appealed his con-
viction to the supreme court. Among his contentions was that the trial
court erred to his prejudice by excluding evidence of the medical ex-
perts' testimony that he was suffering from an abnormal physical and
21 Id. at 62, 273 P. at 778 (1928) (citations omitted).
22 206 Cal. 64, 78, 273 P. 767, 785 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
23 People v. Coleman, 20 Cal. 2d 399, 126 P.2d 349 (1942).
24 Id. at 406, 126 P.2d at 353 (citations omitted).
1971]
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mental condition, not amounting to legal insanity, offered to show that
he did not act with malice aforethought.25
The court reaffirmed the procedural provisions of the law but spe-
cifically disapproved and overruled Troche and the intervening cases
and held that evidence of mental illness, less than legal insanity was ad-
missible to establish state of mind.2 6  The thrust of the main opinion
was that the conclusive presumption of sanity is a conclusive presump-
tion only that the defendant could distinguish between right and wrong
at the time of the commission of the act charged, but that there is no
presumption that the accused did in fact have any specific state of mind
essential to comprise, together with the wrongful act, a particular kind
or degree of crime. Hence the majority reasoned that evidence of in-
sanity, tending to disprove specific intent or malice aforethought, should
be admissible in a specific intent crime.2 7
Although three of the Justices dissented, they did not quarrel with
the principle of the majority, except they reasoned that the error con-
stituted a miscarriage of justice and should have been reversed. Justice
Carter in a separate dissent was of the opinion that the court did not go
far enough, contending that evidence of legal insanity should be admis-
sible under a plea of not guilty to disprove a specific intent. 28
The companion case of People v. Danielly,20 decided on the same
day as Wells, involved the same questions. The same three Justices
also dissented. Justice Edmonds in his dissent in Danielly, hitting at the
heart of the Troche and Leong Fook decisions, stated:
No change was made in section 1019 of the Penal Code which de-
clares: 'The plea of not guilty puts in issue every material allegation
of the indictment or information.' Upon such a plea the prosecution
25 People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 334, 202 P.2d 53, 56 (1949).
28 Id. at 355, 202 P.2d at 68.
27 Id. at 353-54, 202 P.2d at 67.
28 In my opinion that rule is unsound, wholly impractical to apply and will
lead not only to absurd results but will tend to encourage perjury and the juggling
of words by expert witnesses on the question of defendant's mental condition.
It is unsound because it violates the fundamental principle that 'the greater
contains the less.' (Civ. Code § 3536.) If the accused's mentality at the time of
the commission of the unlawful act was such that he could not distinguish between
right and wrong-had no reasoning capacity at all, he could not have had a spe-
cific intent, premeditated or acted maliciously. Thus evidence of that condition
would establish a total lack of intent, premeditation or malice-elements, the
proof of which, is indispensable to establish guilt. It is strange reasoning to say
that you may prove a partial mental quirk or disability to refute the presence of
intent but cannot give evidence of a total mental aberration. That is equivalent
to saying that blindness in one eye will absolve a person from guilt, but that two
sightless eyes will constitute no defense. Is this not a paradoxical absurdity? 33
Cal. 2d at 360, 202 P.2d at 71-73.
20 33 Cal. 2d 362, 202 P.2d 18 (1949).
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must prove intent, as well as deliberation and premeditation, to support
a conviction of first degree murder. 'Intent is a question of fact which
may be proved like any other fact.. .. ' Condition of mind, insufficient
to form an intent, is clearly admissible where the insanity plea is not
made, and it should not be inadmissible merely because later the de-
fendant is to have an opportunity to offer evidence of insanity to a de-
gree that acquits him of the crime. 30
When Nicholas Gorshen, a San Francisco longshoreman, drank a
fifth of a gallon of sloe gin, obtained a gun, and shot and killed his fore-
man, Joseph O'Leary,31 his name became hyphenated with Mr. Wesley
Robert Wells to designate the now famous Wells-Gorshen rule.32
Gorshen was found guilty of second degree murder. The trial court
had received in evidence the testimony of Dr. Bernard Diamond that
the defendant: 1) was suffering from chronic paranoic schizophrenia;
2) on the night of the shooting was drunk; 3) at the time of the killing
acted almost as an automaton; and 4) did not have the mental state
which is required for malice aforethought, premeditation or anything
which implies intention, deliberation or premeditation. In holding that
this evidence was properly received, the supreme court said:
Dr. Diamond's testimony was properly received in accord with the
holding of People v. Wells that on the trial of the issues raised by a
plea of not guilty to a charge of a crime which requires proof of a specific
mental state, competent evidence that because of mental abnormality
not amounting to legal insanity defendant did not possess the essential
specific mental state is admissible33
The inquiry to be made is whether the crime which the defendant is
accused of having committed has in point of fact been committed, and
for this purpose whatever will fairly and legitimately lead to the discov-
ery of the mental condition and status of the accused at the time, may
be given in evidence to the jury, and may be considered by them in de-
termining whether the defendant was in fact guilty of the crime charged
against him.
34
The Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders recom-
mended to the California legislature in their First Report in July of 1962
30 Id. at 387, 202 P.2d at 33 (citations omitted).
31 People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 720, 336 P.2d 492, 494 (1959).
32 See COMMISSION REP'T supra note 2, at 28-29.
33 People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 726, 336 P.2d 492, 498 (1959) (citations
omitted).
34 Id. at 728, 336 P.2d at 500, quoting People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 681-84
(1866) (citations omitted).
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that there be added the following changes in the Penal Code to codify
the present law as laid down by the supreme court in the Wells and
Gorshen cases. Their recommendations were that section 20.5 be
added to the Penal Code and that section 21 be amended in the follow-
ing manner:
20.5. Evidence that the defendant in a criminal proceeding had a
mental disorder shall be admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that
the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is or may be
an issue during the trial.
21. The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances con-
nected with the offense, and the mental condition and discretion of the
accused. 35
To date the legislature has not seen fit to follow the recommendation to
conform the Penal Code to existing law.
In 1963, the supreme court in People v. Henderson"0 concluded:
It can no longer be doubted that the defense of mental illness not
amounting to legal insanity is a 'significant issue' in any case in which
it is raised by substantial evidence. Its purpose and effect are to
ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility practiced by the
M'Naughton rule. . . . This policy is now firmly established in the
law of California.3
7
III. APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF DIMINISHED CAPACITY
Although the principles of Diminished Capacity were enunciated in
the Wells-Gorshen cases, it was in Henderson that the Supreme Court of
California recognized the fact that the doctrine had become firmly em-
bedded in the law of the state. However the application and interpre-
tation of the rules by the courts was yet to come. So was the necessity
for the formulation of jury instructions to meet the varying factual situa-
tions.
It seems apparent from the decided cases that not only have the
Bench and Bar had difficulty in comprehending the nicety of the dis-
tinctions necessarily implicit in the doctrine of Diminished Capacity,"8
but so also, some psychiatrists have not become educated in expressing
their opinions in tune with this changed concept.30
35 CoMMissioN REP'T supra note 2, at 51-52.
36 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
37 Id. at 490-91, 386 P.2d at 682, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (citations omitted).
38 People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 741, 747, 447 P.2d 97, 99, 104, 73 Cal. Rptr.
1, 3, 8 (1968); People v. Conley, 268 Cal. App. 2d 47, 50-56, 73 Cal. Rptr. 673,
676-79 (1968); People v. Moore, 257 Cal. App. 2d 740, 747, 65 Cal. Rptr. 450, 455
(1968).
39 People v. Moore, 257 Cal. App. 2d 740, 746, 65 Cal. Rptr. 450, 455 (1968).
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The principles of Diminished Capacity were first promulgated in
Wells, twenty-one years ago, confirmed in Gorshen eleven years ago,
and since then elucidated in a myriad of decisions by the supreme and
appellate courts. Nevertheless, it is apparent from a review of the
cases, that some members of the profession have yet to grasp the rudi-
ments of the tenets of this doctrine.
From the plethora of cases decided since Wells in 1949, certain clear
and well defined guidelines can be gleaned. An examination of these
cases discloses the principles that follow.
Murder--Generally
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
thought.40 Malice aforethought is obviously an essential element of
the crime. In consequence, a person who intentionally kills may be in-
capable of harboring malice aforethought because of mental disease,
defect or intoxication and in such case cannot be convicted of murder
in either the first or second degree.
41
The intent to kill or seriously injure is also an element of murder 42 in
either degree and therefore, if due to diminished capacity a defendant
had neither malice nor the intent to kill (or seriously injure) he cannot,
under the law, be found guilty of murder in either degree. Absent
either element his offense is involuntary manslaughter.48
Cases of First Degree Murder Reduced to Second Degree
All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing is of the first degree.
44
The intent to kill, requisite in murder of first and second degree is not
synonymous with deliberation and premeditation.
[Intentional and deliberate homicide is murder in the first degree;
intentional homicide without deliberation is, in the absence of mitigating
and exonerating circumstances, murder in the second degree ....
[In short, the use of the words] wilful, deliberate and premeditated...
[indicate] as an element of first degree murder, considerably more re-
40 CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 (West 1957).
41 People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 318, 411 P.2d 911, 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,
820 (1966).
42 People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 86-87, 153 P.2d 21, 35-36 (1944), quoting Pike,
What is Second Degree Murder in California?, 9 S. CAL. L. REv. 112, 120 (1936).
43 People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 391, 461 P.2d 659, 666, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379,
386 (1969).
44 CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (West 1957).
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flection, than the mere amount of thought necessary to form the in-
tention [to kill].4
5
The landmark case in the interpretation of the law of diminished ca-
pacity was in the case of People v. Wolff46 decided in 1964. In that
case the court reviewed the first degree murder life conviction of a
fifteen-year-old boy who had killed his mother with an axe handle. His
full confession and other evidence were sufficient to sustain the first de-
gree judgment, without consideration of the diminished capacity testi-
mony, as the evidence was ample to show that defendant had an intent
to kill, malice aforethought, deliberation and premeditation.
In addition to his plea of not guilty, defendant entered the plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity. At trial it was stipulated that the de-
gree of the crime could be submitted on the basis of the evidence intro-
duced on the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. On the issue of
defendant's legal insanity the four experts were in disagreement. The
court had little difficulty in upholding the verdict of defendant's legal
sanity because there was substantial evidence, although conflicting, to
support the judgment.
47
On the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
verdict of first degree, the court recognized the difficulty
to get across to lay people the idea that a person diagnosed schizophre-
nic may be quite competent, responsible, and not dangerous, and, in
fact, a valuable member of society, albeit at times a personally un-
happy one [and that the] same can be said of every psychiatric diagnosis
or so called mental illness.48
With this recognition and where as in this case, the circumstances dis-
closed "undisputed mental illness", the court reduced the degree of
murder to second degree and as modified affirmed the judgment.40
The California Supreme Court, in what should be understood as
clear and unmistakable language, laid down the rule in this manner:
The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the
reflection. In the case now at bench, in the light of defendant's youth
and undisputed mental illness, all as shown under the California
M'Naughton rule on the trial of the plea of not guilty by reason of in-
45 People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 87, 153 P.2d 21, 36 (1944), quoting Pike, supra
note 32, at 134.
46 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
47 Id. at 812-15, 394 P.2d at 970-71, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 282-83.
48 Id. at 816, 394 P.2d at 972, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 284, quoting Baur, Legal Re-
sponsibility and Mental Illness, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 12, 16-17 (1962).
49 Id. at 823, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
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sanity, and properly considered by the trial judge in the proceeding to
determine the degree of the offense, the true test must include considera-
tion of the somewhat limited extent to which this defendant could ma-
turely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated
act.50
Following Wolff, other cases of first degree murder have been reduced
by the supreme court to second degree for the same reasons.
In People v. Ford,51 defendant shot and killed a deputy sheriff. Ex-
cept for the lack of requisite mental capacity on the part of the defend-
ant, it was clear from the facts that the evidence would have supported a
judgment of first degree.2 In addition to a blood alcohol test calculated
by an expert at approximately 2.3 milligrams of alcohol per milliliter of
blood53 the testimony of the three psychiatrists was that the defendant
was in a semi-conscious or unconscious state when he shot the deputy
and he was not then able to deliberate or premeditate. This evidence
was not contradicted by the prosecution.
54
Seven months after deciding Ford, the same court had before it a case
wherein one Goedecke had been found guilty of the first degree murder
of his father and the second degree murders of his mother, brother and
sister. The same jury found he was sane when he killed his father and
legally insane when he committed the other killings. They fixed the
penalty at death for the murder of his father. 5
Notwithstanding the conflict in the psychiatric testimony, the court
reduced the offense to second degree.56
The defendant in People v. Nicolaus57 was found guilty by a jury on
three counts of murder in a trifurcated trial on the issues of guilt, sanity
50 Id. at 821, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287, quoting in part People v.
Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 900, 156 P.2d 7, 18 (1945).
51 65 Cal. 2d 41, 416 P.2d 132, 52 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
52 Id. at 51, 416 P.2d at 138, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
5S3 Id. at 52, 416 P.2d at 138, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
54 Id. at 55, 416 P.2d at 140, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
55 People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 852, 423 P.2d 777, 779, 56 Cal. Rptr.
625, 627 (1967).
5O The court in Goedecke concluded:
Thus, although there was a direct conflict with respect to defendant's ability to
form an intent to kill and to premeditate the killing, two psychiatrists saying that
he had that ability and the remaining two taking the contrary view, there was no
psychiatric testimony as to the extent to which defendant could maturely and
meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of this contemplated act. In other words,
even though we assume, as we must, that the trier of fact determined that defend-
ant did have the mental capacity at the time to form the intent to kill, this con-
clusion does not foreclose our inquiry in a perplexing murder of the kind here
present as to whether the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of mur-
der of the first degree. Id. at 857, 423 P.2d at 782, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
57 65 Cal. 2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967).
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and penalty. He had killed his three children by shooting them. Found
sane, the jury imposed the penalty at death.1
8
Again, as in Goedecke, the psychiatric testimony, while in conflict,
was uncontradicted as to defendant's abnormal conduct."0 Justices
Mosk and McComb in their dissents would have affirmed the judg-
ments. 60
However, in People v. Bassett,61 a unanimous court was seemingly
not concerned in agreeing to reduce a verdict of first degree murder to
one of second degree. The jury had also found defendant sane on his
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The court characterized its problem in this recitation of the de-
fendant's mental condition:
We have before us the tragedy of a youth suffering since childhood
from deep-seated paranoid schizophrenia, who at the age of 18 method-
ically executed his mother and father. The evidence is overwhelming
that while he planned the patricide with precision and knew that it was
wrong, his diminished mental capacity was such that he could not ma-
turely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated
acts. The deputy district attorney acknowledged in argument to the
jury that 'everyone, including myself, everyone agrees that this boy was
and had been a paranoid type of schizophrenic'; indeed, defendant's
abnormal mental condition was well known long in advance of trial.
In these circumstances we must once again shoulder the burden of
dissecting a lengthy record and weighing the 'substantiality' of the
prosecution's evidence of mental capacity. This is a responsibility we
are empowered by state to perform and we will not hesitate to act, as
here, to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. 62
After a review of the evidence and the law governing appeals on con-
flicting evidence, the court solemnly declared:
But we do not here sit in judgment on a medieval trial by oath. A
man's life, in our system of justice, cannot be made to depend on whether
or not the witnesses against him correctly recite by rote a certain ritual
formula. There is no magic in the particular words emphasized in
Goedecke and Nicolaus: the court was there concerned, rather, with
the prosecution's failure to introduce expert proof on the issue we thus
58 Id. at 869, 423 P.2d at 790, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
56 Id. at 878, 423 P.2d at 795, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
60 Id. at 884, 423 P.2d at 799, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
61 69 Cal. 2d 122, 443 P.2d 777, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968). But see People v.
Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
62 People v. Bassett, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 124-25, 443 P.2d 777, 778-79, 70 Cal. Rptr.
193, 194-95 (1968) (citations omitted).
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des~ribed, i.e., the extent of the individual's capacity to reflect on the
gravity of his proposed act. In the case at bar, therefore, we cannot
call a halt to our inquiry merely because the prosecution's experts
uttered the 'correct' words; we must press on, and determine the sub-
stantiality of the proof which that testimony purported to represent.
63
The court, after struggling with the conflict in the psychiatric testi-
mony and evaluating its weight, concluded:
When the foundation of an expert's testimony is determined to be
inadequate as a matter of law, we are not bound by an apparent con-
flict in the evidence created by his bare conclusions.
64
Cases of First Degree Murder Affirmed and Not
Reduced to Second Degree
It would unduly lengthen this review to recite the evidentiary predi-
cate for the courts' refusal to reduce verdicts of first degree murder to
second degree. They are'numerous and will continue to multiply. By
way of example, a few of these cases are footnoted.6 5 Suffice it to say
these cases fail to show evidence supporting a sufficient factual back-
ground of substantially reduced mental capacity, and hence were af-
firmed.
A review of the foregoing cases leads to the conclusion that, for the
time being at least, the California Supreme Court will not hesitate to re-
duce a murder of the first degree to that of second where there is sub-
stantial psychiatric evidence to support a defendant's claim of dimin-
ished capacity. This appears to be particularly true when the totality
of the circumstances convinces the court that a defendant at the time
of the offense was truly suffering from a substantial mental disease, de-
fect, or was truly and substantially intoxicated to the extent that his men-
tal condition affected his intent to kill or harbor malice. It would ap-
pear that the court probably does so, realizing that lay juries are not
sufficiently versed in the law's niceties, and are not capable of capturing
the gradations and shades of states of mind, by following the laby-
rinthine testimony of psychiatrists.
0s Id. at 140-41, 443 P.2d at 789, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
64 Id. at 148, 443 P.2d at 794, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
6 In re Kemp, 1 Cal. 3d 190, 460 P.2d 481, 81 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1969); People v.
Risenhoover, 70 Cal. 2d 39, 447 P.2d 925, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1968); People v.
McQuiston, 12 Cal. App. 3d 584, 90 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1970); People v. Beach, 263
Cal. App. 2d 476, 69 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1968); People v. Caylor, 259 Cal. App. 2d 191,
66 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968); People v. Fortman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 45, 64 Cal. Rptr.
669 (1968).
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To obviate this lack, and empowered by legislative fiat, 0 the ap-
pellate courts, with commendable courage, but with discerning restraint,
have not hesitated to correct injustice when it appeared in the record.
Second Degree Murder
Other than first degree, "all other kinds of murder are of the second
degree."
67
Under the cases heretofore discussed, even though the evidence may
show that a defendant not only had an intent to kill and killed with
deliberation and premeditation, nevertheless if his evidence is sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt that his mental capacity was substantially
diminished to the extent that he could not maturely and meaningfully
premeditate, deliberate and reflect upon the gravity of his act, or form
the intent to kill, his guilt of murder can only be that of second degree.08
Felony-Murder Rules
"All murder which is . . . committed in the perpetration of, or at-
tempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem, or any
act punishable under section 288 is murder of the first degree. . .. "all
To convict one for murder in the first degree, the prosecution, in ad-
dition to proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a killing occurred as
the result of the commission of or attempt to commit one of the enumer-
ated felonies specified in Penal Code section 189,10 whether the killing
was intentional, unintentional or accidental, must also prove that there
existed in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit one
or more of such crimes.
71
It follows that if the defendant presents evidence that at the time the
crime was allegedly committed, he was suffering from some abnormal
66 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1191(6) (West 1957).
67 Id. § 189 (West Supp. 1970); See People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 23-26, 447
P.2d 942, 946-48, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554-56 (1968).
68 People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 317-23, 411 P.2d 911, 914-19, 49 Cal. Rptr.
815, 818-23 (1966); People v. Conley, 268 Cal. App. 2d 47, 50-56, 73 Cal. Rptr.
673, 675-78 (1968).
69 CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1970).
70 Section 189 provides:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a bomb, poison, lying in wait, tor-
ture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which
is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under Section 288, is murder of the first
degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree. Id.
71 See People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 392, 461 P.2d 659, 666, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379,
387 (1969); People v. Whitehorn, 60 Cal. 2d 256, 264, 383 P.2d 783, 787, 32 Cal. Rptr.
199, 203 (1963); CAIsc No. 8.21.
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mental or physical condition which prevented him from forming the
specific intent or mental state essential to constitute the crime alleged
to be the basis for the application of the felony murder rule, he cannot
be convicted of first degree murder under that doctrine.7"
The California Supreme Court has summarized the dimin-
ished capacity, felony-murder rule and the need for explicit jury instruc-
tions thusly:
As we recently observed in a case concerning a killing in the perpe-
tration or attempt to perpetrate robbery: 'In cases in which the prose-
cution advances a felony-murder theory, defendant is entitled, upon a
sufficient factual showing, to instructions negating a conviction on a fel-
ony-murder theory if, at the time of the alleged offense, defendant could
not form the specific intent-here, the intent 'to permanently deprive the
owner of his property'-that serves as a necessary element of the felony
charged.
In the present case the prosecution advanced the felony-murder
theory as to robbery, rape, and burglary. Defendant adduced a proper
factual showing of diminished capacity which might negate his intent
'to permanently deprive the owner of his property' to enter the house of
another with the intent to commit a felony, or to commit an act of sexual
intercourse with force upon a woman not his wife.
By failing to instruct the jury that defendant's diminished capacity
might rebut each of the specific intents necessary to a finding of a killing
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate rape, burglary, or robbery,
and hence rebut the prosecution's felony-murder theory of first degree
murder, the trial court deprived defendant of this constitutional right
'to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evi-
dence.'73
Manslaughter
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without mal-
ice. It is of three kinds:
1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion;
2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amount-
ing to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circum-
spection; provided that this subdivision shall not apply to acts com-
mitted in the driving of a vehicle.
72 People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 392-93, 461 P.2d 659, 666-67, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 386-87 (1969); People v. Stewart, 267 Cal. App. 2d 366, 372-76, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 486-90 (1968).
73 People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 392-93, 461 P.2d 659, 656-66, 82 Cal. Rptr.
379, 387 (1969) (citations omitted).
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3. In the driving of a vehicle. .... 74
It is of utmost importance that the legal practitioner realize that in
effect there is now, as a result of the application of the concept of di-
minished capacity, a kind or species of manslaughter not found in the
definition of manslaughter set forth in Penal Code section 192 .
7
The supreme court in its first consideration of People v. Conley,"8
pointed out with meticulous care, under the facts of that case, "the jury
could have found that although defendant deliberated and premeditated
the killings, his intoxication and mental disorder precluded malice afore-
thought,77 and that the absence of malice aforethought will preclude a
finding of murder in either degree. Hence as the court observed, "a
person who intentionally kills may be incapable of harboring malice
aforethought because of mental disease defect, or intoxication, and in
such case his killing, unless justified or excused, is voluntary man-
slaughter.
78
Notwithstanding the supreme court reversal and analysis of the law
in the first Conley case, on retrial, the California Court of Appeal in
the second appeal was forced to comment:
[O]n Conley's first appeal, on substantially identical evidence as here,
the Supreme Court held that the absence of the instruction on statutory
voluntary manslaughter required reversal. An examination of the rec-
ord of the last trial indicates omission of this very instruction. The
same result-reversal-must follow here.79
People v. Castillo,"0 is additional authority to support the conclusions
expressed in Conley:
[2] What the Conley opinion teaches is that there is a type of
voluntary manslaughter which does not come within any of the three
definitions found in Penal Code section 192. . . . The nonstatutory
voluntary manslaughter is a homicide which may be intentional, volun-
tary, deliberate, premeditated, and unprovoked. It differs from murder
in that the element of malice has been rebutted by a showing that the
defendant's mental capacity was reduced by mental illness, mental
defect or intoxication. [3] To explain manslaughter in terms of its
statutory elements, as set forth in section 192, does not reveal to the
74 CAL. PEN. CODE § 192 (West 1957).
75 Id.
76 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
77 Id. at 323, 411 P.2d at 919, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
78 Id. at 318, 411 P.2d at 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
79 People v. Conley, 268 Cal. App. 2d 47, 51-52, 73 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (1968).
80 70 Cal. 2d 264, 449 P.2d 449, 74 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1969). See also People v.
Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 455 P.2d 153, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969).
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jury the existence of the nonstatutory form of the offense. The statutory
definition carries the implication that only a homicide provided by pas-
sion or a sudden quarrel can be classified as voluntary manslaughter.81
The decisions noted can be summarized and abbreviated by the sim-
ple observation that if there is any evidence to negate malice one can-
not be found guilty of murder in either degree because it is an essential
element of the crime of murder. But where, absent malice, the killing
is intentional, voluntary, deliberate, premeditated and unprovoked, it is
voluntary manslaughter because manslaughter by its very definition, is
the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice.
Unconsciousness
All persons are capable of committing crimes except: "... persons
who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.18 2
This form of unconsciousness exculpating a person from responsi-
bility for crime has the same effect as legal insanity, that is to say, it is
a complete defense to any crime, felony or misdemeanor, specific intent
and non-specific intent crimes alike.
It differs from the defense of legal insanity procedurally. The de-
fense of not guilty by reason of insanity must be raised by special plea.83
The defense of unconsciousness, under Penal Code section 26, requires
no special plea and is raised by the plea of not guilty. 4
Unconsciousness governed by Penal Code section 26 is that type
of consciousness that is involuntary, such as that suffered by somnam-
bulists, or persons suffering from the delerium of fever, epilepsy, a blow
on the head or the involuntary taking of drugs or intoxicating liquor and
other cases in which there is no functioning of the conscious mind.85
Unconsciousness resulting from the voluntary taking of drugs or in-
toxicating liquors is not a complete defense to crime; it only ameliorates
or diminishes the responsibility and is governed by Penal Code sec-
tion 22.8
6
Chief Justice Traynor in an extensive footnote in the first Conley
opinion suggested a jury instruction to be given when evidence of di-
81 People v. Castillo, 70 Cal. 2d 264, 270, 449 P.2d 449, 452, 74 Cal. Rptr. 385,
388 (1969).
82 CAL. PEN. CODE § 26(5) (West 1957).
83 Id. § 1026.
84 People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 65, 198 P.2d 865, 872 (1948).
85 CAL,= No. 4.30.
86 People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 316, 455 P.2d 153, 161, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217,
225 (1969).
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minished capacity due to the voluntary taking of alcohol or drugs is in-
troduced by the defense.
87
It is also imperative to note the distinction raised in Castillo.8
When evidence of diminished capacity is presented by the de-
fense not causing unconsciousness, but is sufficient to negate malice,
such evidence would suffice to reduce the crime of murder to volun-
tary manslaughter,89 as distinguished from involuntary manslaughter.
It follows that when evidence of diminished capacity due to the volun-
tary taking of intoxicants results in unconsciousness, negating malice,
such evidence would suffice to reduce the crime to involuntary man-
slaughter. In such case, appropriate instructions must be given the jury
by the court to that effect.
Crimes Other Than Homicide
The elementary principle that absent proof of any essential element
of any crime, a conviction of a crime other than homicide is precluded
was reiterated by the California Supreme Court in its opinion in Peo-
ple v. Butler:0
Although an intent to steal may ordinarily be inferred when one per-
son takes the property of another, particularly if he takes it by force,
proof of the existence of a state of mind incompatible with an intent
to steal precludes either theft or robbery.9'
It necessarily follows that where proof of diminished capacity suffi-
ciently negates the existence of a state of mind essential to the proof of
any crime, other than the homicides, no conviction of that particular
crime can ensue.
The first inkling that the law might be otherwise arose from the
gratuitous observation made by the court in People v. Glover " when the
court unnecessarily stated: "In this state of the law, we will assume
for the sake of argument only, that the defense of diminished capacity
was properly available in this case."
98
This "state of law" referred to was a footnote stating:
In the recent case of People v. Hoxie, it was pointed out that our
87 People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 324 n.4, 411 P.2d 911, 920 n.4, 49 Cal. Rptr.
815, 824 n.4 (1966).
88 People v. Castillo, 70 Cal. 2d 264, 449 P.2d 449, 74 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1969).
89 Id. at 269-70, 449 P.2d at 451-52, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
90 65 Cal. 2d 569, 421 P.2d 703, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1967).
91 Id. at 573, 421 P.2d at 706, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
92 257 Cal. App. 2d 502, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1967).
93 Id. at 506, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
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Supreme Court has thus far been willing to hold in homicide cases, as
a matter of law, that undisputed mental illnesses can negative delibera-
tion and premeditation but has not yet held in such cases that it can
have such an effect upon 'a less complex specific intent.'
94
This unwarranted assumption was predicated upon a misconception
of Presiding Justice Kaus' exposition of the complexities of states of
mind. His full statement, in People v. Hoxie,95 was:
The exact reason why undisputed mental illness appears to negative
deliberation and premeditation as a matter of law, but does not so effect
a less complex specific intent, will have to be stated by the Supreme
Court. On our part we are satisfied that, had defendant killed one of his
victims and been convicted of second degree murder, the Supreme Court
would not modify the judgment.96
Presiding Justice Kaus had a case under consideration in which de-
fendant had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with the
intent to commit murder, by a court sitting without a jury. Defendant
on appeal contended that the evidence did not support the implied
finding that defendant had the mental capacity to intend to commit
murder. The trial judge after argument of counsel had said: "I am
well persuaded here, satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that the de-
fendant had sufficient capacity to be guilty of second degree murder had
one of his victims died."9 7  The Justice evidently and understandably
concluded, that if the defendant Hoxie had the capacity to be guilty of
second degree murder, he obviously had the capacity to have the "in-
tent to commit murder" and therefore was guilty of the crime of as-
sault with a deadly weapon with the intent to commit murder.
If the following italicized words were added to Justice Kaus' state-
ment, to wit, "The exact reason why undisputed mental illness appears
to negative deliberation and premeditation as a matter of law but does
not so affect a less complex specific intent [such as malice afore-
thought] will have to be stated by the Supreme Court", it might clarify
his observation as to a "less complex specific intent".98
94 Id. (citations omitted).
95 252 Cal. App. 2d 901, 61 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
96 Id. at 916, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
97 Id. at 914, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
98 Id. at 914, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 46. This interpretation is fortified by the footnote in
People v. Caylor, 259 Cal. App. 2d 191, 203 n.6, 66 Cal. Rptr. 448, 456 n.6 (1968),
citing People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal. App. 2d 901, 914-16, 61 Cal. Rptr. 37, 45-46 (1967):
To date, our Supreme Court has apparently never reduced a finding of first
degree murder to manslaughter notwithstanding its power to do so. This may be
because of the less complex character of the required intent.
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The error in Glover, noted above, was compounded when the court
in People v. Rodriguez9" again raised the question needlessly as fol-
lows:
There is a question as to whether or not the principle of diminished
capacity is available to negate specific intent or applies at all in other
than homicide cases. However, we need not attack that problem. 100
While considering the felony-murder rule in connection with the
crime of murder in People v. Mosher,1'0 the California Supreme Court
implicitly ruled that in cases of robbery, rape and burglary, upon a
proper showing, a defendant is entitled to jury instructions that de-
fendant's diminished capacity might rebut the specific intents necessary
to commit such crimes.
The California Court of Appeal, in reviewing an appeal from a con-
viction of violation of Penal Code section 476a, 10 2 feloniously issuing
checks without sufficient funds, stated the rule correctly in People v.
Gentry:1
0 3
Lack of specific intent to defraud may be shown by adducing proof
of diminished mental capacity upon a not guilty plea. A 'plea of
not guilty puts in issue every material allegation of the accusatory
pleading', and when a specific kind or particular type of mental state
or intent is a part of the corpus delicti of the crime charged, the not
guilty plea puts in issue the existence of that state of mind.
It has long been settled that evidence of diminished mental capacity,
whether caused by intoxication, trauma, or disease, can be used to show
that a defendant did not have a specific mental state essential to an
offense.10
4
So also in the recent case of People v. Noah,10 5 the court of appeal
considered the application of the rule of diminished capacity to the
crime of assault by a prisoner serving less than a life sentence, 00 and
concluded:
Since People v. Wells, it has been the law of this state that evidence
of diminished mental capacity, whether caused by intoxication, trauma
or disease, can be used to show that a defendant did not have a specific
mental state essential to an offense. Although first introduced and
99 272 Cal. App. 2d 80, 76 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1969).
100 Id. at 85, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (citations omitted).
101 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969).
102 CAL. PEN. CODE § 476(a) (West 1957).
103 257 Cal. App. 2d 607, 65 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1968).
104 Id. at 610, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 238 (citations omitted).
10 12 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 91 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1970).
106 CAL. PEN. CODE § 4501 (West 1957).
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usually involved in homicide cases, the rule is of general application:
mental illness not amounting to legal insanity may negative the existence
of a particular mental state that is an element of the, crime charged.10 7
The inexorable conclusion is that the principle of diminished capacity
is also available to negate the issue of specific intent in all crimes other
than homicide cases where such intent is a necessary element and any
questions raised in Glover and Rodriguez are misconceived. An impor-
tant sidelight to this question has at long last been settled by the supreme
court in People v. Rocha.10 8  A conflict has long existed in the deci-
sions of the courts of appeal as to whether a violation of Penal Code sec-
tion 245,109 assault with a deadly weapon, is a crime requiring proof of
general or specific intent'1 0 The supreme court resolved this con-
flict and has held that the crime of assault with a deadly weapon does
not require proof of any specific intent and is only a general intent
crime."' Accordingly, evidence of diminished capacity is inadmissi-
ble and may not be considered to reduce the offense.12
IV. CONCLUSION
The principles of the law of diminished capacity are not difficult to
understand. The application of the principles to a given set of facts or
a particular mental state may require some thoughtful consideration and
the devotion of time and effort.
It is a matter of concern to all that the administration of justice, and
particularly the administration of criminal justice is under attack and
criticism because of the "Law's delays". The calendars of trial and
appellate courts are seriously overloaded. In part, some of the appeals
and retrials are the direct result of the carelessness or lack of diligence
of a few members of the trial bar and bench, who do not read, or if they
read, do not read with sufficient care, the guidelines so carefully laid
down by by the courts of appeal and supreme court. It, therefore,
behooves each of us to do his share, at least in a small way to improve
this unfortunate situation.
107 12 Cal. App. 3d at 1147, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 249 citing People v. Castillo, 70 Cal.
2d 264, 449 P.2d 449, 74 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1969); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411
P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d
677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
108 3 Cal. 3d 893, 479 P.2d 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1971).
109 CAL. PEN. CODE § 245 (West Supp. 1970-71).
110 3 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 479 P.2d at 374, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
III Id. at 899, 479 P.2d at 376-77, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
112 Id. at 896-97, 479 P.2d at 374-75, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75. See also People v.
Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969). In view of the decision
in Rocha, CAI..nc Nos. 9.00 & 9.03 are no longer applicable and must be revised.
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This can be done by lawyers in cases involving the defense of di-
minished capacity by a study of the cases. An easy start, in one's
study, can be the use of California Jury Instructions Criminal
(CALJIC). There the principles are set out succinctly in the form of
jury instructions. The use notes and comments below each instruction
should be read and given meticulous consideration. The cases cited
should be Shepardized. The manner of CALJIC's use should be read
and reread to make certain that no avenue is overlooked.
The profession, lawyers and trial judges alike, should not consider
the preparation of instructions as a routine bothersome detail. Too
many cases are necessarily reversed for lack of attention to this impor-
tant aspect of trial. Counsel should always request the court prior to
argument for a conference on the instructions.' 3 Adequate time and
attention should and must be devoted by court and counsel in the dis-
cussion and settlement of jury instructions.
Prosecutor, defense lawyers and judges working together can make
a constructive contribution in the saving of time and unnecessary trials,
retrials and appeals by giving significant consideration to the evidence
of diminished capacity. Where there is merit to such evidence an in-
telligent and proper disposition by plea should be made. To that end
greater use should be made of pretrial conferences between prosecution
and defense and, when necessary, with the court. Pride of victory
should never prompt a prosecutor to seek the death penalty when some
poor wretch is suffering from a substantial mental illness that affects
some essential facet of his intent. So also, as a matter of practical ef-
fect, it makes comparatively little difference whether the defendant is
sentenced to first degree murder with a life sentence, or second degree
murder in many cases. Conversely, defense counsel should properly
evaluate a case and bargain for a proper disposition, rather than gam-
ble for a better result by trial.
If each in his own sphere will do his part to improve the adminis-
tration of justice, the public and the profession as well will reap the
benefit.
113 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1093.5 (West 1957).
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